The day after the war on Gaza… Different scenarios

By Mohammad al-Odat

Almost all parties involved in the Palestinian issue (the U.S., Israel, and the Palestinian Authority) seem to agree on the necessity of ending Hamas’s rule in Gaza, disposing of weapons, and ending the Palestinian resistance. However, the fundamental disagreement revolves around what is known as the day after the war on Gaza. Who will politically govern Gaza? Who will control Gaza’s security after the war? And how will this impact the Palestinian issue as a whole?

Scenarios for the day after the war on Gaza

The declared American scenario for the day after the war on Gaza appears to be based on the idea of returning Gaza to its pre-Hamas military takeover state in 2007. It aims to place Gaza, along with the West Bank, under the control of the Palestinian Authority. The goal is to replicate the West Bank model in terms of security coordination to preserve Israel’s security. Additionally, it aims to launch a peace process leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a unique nature, as described by the American side, or the unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state with active and influential international parties.

While the Palestinian Authority works on rehabilitating and renewing itself according to American conditions, which seek to pressure Israel to allow the Palestinian Authority to manage Gaza in the aftermath of the war on Gaza, the resignation of the Palestinian Prime Minister is read within this context.

However, the Israeli scenario presented by the right-wing government led by Netanyahu is entirely different. The Israeli leadership seeks to maintain direct Israeli military presence in Gaza to ensure complete control, disarm the resistance, and dismantle the Hamas movement. This is to prevent Palestinian resistance movements from rebuilding and to divide Gaza into three sections with security barriers separating each part. Israel also aims to control the borders between Gaza and Egypt to prevent any future weapons smuggling operations for the resistance movements.

As for the governance of Gaza and its civilian administration, the Israeli scenario talks about a new authority in Gaza that gives civilian governance to some individuals from the clans who are described as connected and close to Israeli security agencies. Additionally, it involves giving the reconstruction of Gaza to some allied Arab countries. At the same time, there is an effort to reshape the awareness of the “Gazan” society by changing educational curricula in educational and cultural institutions, and seeking inspiration from some Arab models that played a role in combating terrorism, according to their description.

The Israeli side rejects any step or talk about the establishment of a Palestinian state through unilateral international recognition. The Israeli government issued a decision approved by the Knesset with the agreement of 99 out of 120 members to refuse to deal with any unilateral international recognition of a Palestinian state. This is to maintain the option of bilateral negotiations, which Israel uses as a delaying tactic to gain time and annex Palestinian territories in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley, thus ending the idea of establishing a Palestinian state and getting rid of it.

The Israeli side envisions that some Arab countries would have a hand in preparing and selecting who governs Gaza if necessary. This would involve identifying individuals capable of fulfilling this role. The Israeli side believes that these countries share its goal of overthrowing Hamas’s rule in Gaza, which is considered part of the project to undermine political Islam, deriving its popularity and legitimacy from the struggles of resistance movements in Palestine.

Ultimately, according to the Israeli right-wing scenario, this would lead to voluntary or soft displacement of the “Gazan” people to neighboring countries or migration to Western countries.

The Arab position or the Arab quintet (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE) is in harmony with the American administration, which bases its plan on establishing a long-term peace and a roadmap for the creation of a Palestinian state.

The Arab plan revolves around a ceasefire, releasing Israeli hostages in Gaza as a result of an agreement between Hamas and the Israeli side, addressing the settlement issue in the West Bank, which consumes more than 43% of its promised Palestinian state territories, establishing a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, providing security guarantees to Israel, normalizing relations with all Arab countries, involving the political wing of Hamas in this political process, integrating it into the Palestinian Authority, and obtaining recognition of the Palestinian state by major powers and influential international parties, even if unilaterally.

Internal pressures

While the U.S. administration, along with the Arab quintet, adopts the option of recognizing a Palestinian state and annexing Gaza to the West Bank, returning it to the rule of the Palestinian Authority after the war, the U.S. administration faces intense political pressure before the presidential elections regarding its support for the war on Gaza. The recent pressure includes statements made by the American pilot Aaron Bushnell, 25 years old, who burned himself and declared that he would no longer be complicit in supporting genocide, referring to Israel’s actions in Gaza.

The sensitivity of the U.S. electoral scene, which showed Trump ahead of Biden in the latest opinion polls, coupled with the U.S. administration’s portrayal as a directly involved partner in allowing Israeli actions amounting to genocide against the Palestinian people, through its political support in the UN and unlimited military support, tarnishes the image that the United States tries to present as a champion of human rights and protector of the rights of peoples in determining their destiny.

While the Israeli government faces pressure from the U.S. administration to accept a temporary ceasefire in Gaza and halt the incursion into Rafah, it also deals with public anger and protests, particularly from the families of prisoners in Gaza. This is especially true after Hamas announced the killing of seven prisoners in an Israeli airstrike. The Israeli opposition has demanded that the Israeli people besiege the Knesset, overthrow the government, and call for early elections.

This is accompanied by significant economic pressure resulting from the war on Gaza, with daily losses reaching $267 million. It is expected that Israel’s losses will exceed $55 billion by the end of the war on Gaza. Additionally, the Israeli military incurs losses in this war. Amidst all this, a growing gap widens between the Israeli government and the United States, which has threatened to impose sanctions on some Israeli ministers, including the Minister of National Security Ben Gantz and Finance Minister Smotrich, while ignoring Prime Minister Netanyahu and dealing with Benny Gantz, the minister in the Israeli war government.

Who will enforce their vision?

Even if the United States has the upper hand in determining the region’s fate, it remains concerned with maintaining regional stability and preserving its interests. While the U.S. administration talks about the necessity of recognizing a Palestinian state and hints at unilateral recognition, its strategic choice, despite differences with the Israeli right-wing government, will still prioritize Israel’s security and maintaining Israeli dominance in all areas. The U.S. will refrain from interfering in Israel’s internal affairs.

The history of Democratic U.S. administrations shows that the United States has not exerted sufficient pressure on Israel in critical situations since the Oslo Accords. It often yields to the insistence and firmness of right-wing Israeli administrations that refuse to concede anything to the Palestinians.

Arab positions seem to reflect the U.S. stance, advancing if the U.S. administration advances and receding if the U.S. administration retreats. The cards of Arab countries supporting the U.S. perspective are neither influential nor capable of imposing their views and pressuring the Israeli administration to accept these solutions. There are no influential and essential cards in the hands of the Arab side that believes in the Palestinian state to press for recognition and establishment.

Assuming – with skepticism about its accuracy – that the U.S. administration was serious and sincere in recognizing the Palestinian state and not tactically avoiding a sensitive political phase before the elections, as this position suggests, then the scene would be completely different. The U.S. and Arab visions would be closer to implementation if the current U.S. president, Joe Biden, wins the second term in the presidential elections and returns to the White House, if the Israeli army fails to achieve a complete victory in Gaza, and if resistance continues to inflict more losses on the Israeli military. Concurrently, the ongoing bleeding impacts the Israeli government’s sustainability and future. Under these conditions, the Arab quintet would present a cohesive stance.

However, if the Israeli army manages to decisively win the battle in Gaza, eliminate Hamas militarily, gain quiet military control over Gaza, tighten its security grip, dismantle the organizational structures of Hamas, and if Trump, the former president, returns to the White House, the Israeli right-wing scenario for the day after the war will be implemented. At that point, the extremist Israeli government will seek to go beyond the Deal of the Century by pursuing complete displacement of Palestinians, emptying all Palestinian territories, swallowing the entire geography, and getting rid of demographics.

The war in Gaza will not end soon as Palestinian resistance remains capable of continuing. The fate of Gaza will be determined by the results of the war on the ground, and the outcome of the U.S. elections, which will not be decided until the last ballot is counted.

Therefore, none of the options shaping the future of Gaza will be determined until November of this year. The results of the war on the ground and the U.S. elections will be the decisive factors in determining who will impose their vision on the fate and future of Gaza and the Palestinian issue. This assumes that the U.S. administration was serious and sincere in what it proposed regarding the Palestinian state.

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